The failure of strategic nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria: ‘political ju-jitsu’ in reverse by Davies, T. R.
Davies, T. R. (2014). The failure of strategic nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria: 
‘political ju-jitsu’ in reverse. Global Change, Peace and Security, 26(3), pp. 299-313. doi: 
10.1080/14781158.2014.924916 
City Research Online
Original citation: Davies, T. R. (2014). The failure of strategic nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, 
Libya and Syria: ‘political ju-jitsu’ in reverse. Global Change, Peace and Security, 26(3), pp. 299-
313. doi: 10.1080/14781158.2014.924916 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/13046/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 1 
The failure of strategic nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and 
Syria: ‘political ju-jitsu’ in reverse 
 
Thomas Richard Davies 
Department of International Politics, City University London, UK 
 
This article seeks to advance understanding of strategic nonviolent action through 
providing a more comprehensive assessment of the factors that may contribute 
towards the failure of nonviolent campaigns than has been undertaken to date. It 
disaggregates the wide range of international and national circumstances relevant 
to the failure of nonviolent action, illustrated with reference to experience of 
nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria since 2011. Through exploring 
these cases, the article proceeds to reveal how adherence to the assumed principles 
of nonviolent strategy may be insufficient in contributing towards success. It 
concludes by outlining four pathways by which nonviolent strategy may contribute 
towards its own failure, including its supersession by armed conflict. 
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Introduction 
Recent years have seen renewed interest in strategic nonviolent action.1 
Chenoweth and Stephan’s conclusion that ‘nonviolent resistance methods are 
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‘Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict’, International Security 33, 
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(eds), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent Action from Gandhi to the 
Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 and 2011); Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Nonviolent 
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likely to be more successful than violent methods in achieving strategic 
objectives’2 may be becoming the new conventional wisdom on the subject. In 
work on the Arab uprisings since 2010, for instance, it has been argued that ‘Arab 
opposition movements … would never have achieved what they have today had 
they resorted to violence or had they been drawn into using it in their bid to 
achieve their demands’.3 It has further been argued that ‘the methods of peaceful 
resistance of 1989, and in subsequent opposition movements in other states and 
continents … [are] … becoming the “default” model of how to deal with dictatorial 
regimes and foreign occupations … not just for Europe, not just for the Arab world, 
but also more generally’.4 
 The recent wave of literature on strategic nonviolent action has put 
forward a number of claims with respect to the factors facilitating its successful 
use. A common claim is that consistent adherence to the use of nonviolent rather 
than violent methods – ‘the maintenance of non-violence discipline’ – is critical in 
delegitimating opponents’ justifications for repression.5 Linked to this is Gene 
Sharp’s notion of ‘political ju-jitsu’ by which violent repression of nonviolent 
resistance is said to have the potential to strengthen rather than to undermine that 
resistance by generating ‘widespread revulsion’ and in turn greater support for 
                                                        
Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); 
Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Lester R. Kurtz (eds), Nonviolent Conflict and Civil Resistance (Bingley: 
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2
 Stephan and Chenoweth, ‘Why Civil Resistance Works’, 42. 
3
 Khair El-Din Haseeb, ‘On the Arab “Democratic Spring”: Lessons Derived’, Contemporary Arab 
Affairs 4, no. 2 (2011): 115. 
4
 Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Foreword to the Paperback Edition: The Arab Spring’, in 
Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of 
Nonviolent Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ix. 
5
 Anika Locke Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic, ‘Power and persuasion: Nonviolent strategies to influence 
state security forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004)’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, 
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the resistance movement.6 In the case of nonviolent resistance to governments, it 
has been emphasised that the ability of a resistance movement to convert 
members of the armed forces has been critical in successful instances of 
nonviolent action.7 In addition, ‘widespread, cross-cutting, and decentralized 
mobilization’ is said to be vital, as is ‘systematic planning’ by a broadly 
representative leadership with realistic goals.8  
 Although there are a few notable exceptions,9 examinations of cases of 
failed nonviolent resistance movements are sparse in comparison with analyses 
of successful instances. Evaluation of factors responsible for failure is also rare in 
comparison with evaluation of factors responsible for success.10 This article aims 
to address both deficits through its examination of nonviolent action in the 
uprisings in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria since 2011. In so doing, this article 
will challenge much of the new conventional wisdom about strategic nonviolent 
action outlined in the preceding two paragraphs. 
 It is first necessary to delineate what is meant in this article by nonviolent 
action and by the distinction between success and failure. Resistance movements 
are rarely exclusively nonviolent or exclusively violent in respect of the methods 
deployed by protesters. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish between 
                                                        
6
 Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 47. 
7
 Stephan and Chenoweth, ‘Why Civil Resistance Works’, 42; Binnendijk and Marovic, ‘Power and 
Persuasion’; Sharon Erickson Nepstad, ‘Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of 
Military-Opposition Alliances’, Swiss Political Science Review 17, no. 4 (2011): 485–491; Sharon 
Erickson Nepstad ‘Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and 
Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain and Syria’, Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 337-349.  
8
 Stephan and Chenoweth, ‘Why Civil Resistance Works’, 42; Ackerman and Rodal, ‘Strategic 
Dimensions of Civil Resistance’, 117-118. 
9
 See, for example, the examination of Burma in Stephan and Chenoweth, Why Civil Resistance Works; 
and of Northern Ireland, China, Kosovo and Burma in Roberts and Garton Ash, Civil Resistance and 
Power Politics; and Brian Martin, Wendy Varney and Adrian Vickers, ‘Political Jiu-Jitsu against 
Indonesian Repression: Studying Lower-Profile Nonviolent Resistance’, Pacifica Review 13, no. 2 
(2001): 143-156. 
10
 Stephan and Chenoweth, Why Civil Resistance Works, for example, dedicates one chapter to 
explanation of a failed case, but three chapters to successes. 
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movements for which nonviolent methods are the principal approach, and those 
for which violent methods are predominant.11 In this article, it is argued that – at 
least in the initial stages of the uprisings – each of the Bahraini, Egyptian, Libyan 
and Syrian cases evaluated here were predominantly nonviolent. Whereas a 
nonviolent approach remained primary in the Bahraini and Egyptian cases in the 
periods evaluated here, the Libyan and Syrian cases were to transform from 
predominantly nonviolent to predominantly violent mobilizations.  
Following Chenoweth and Stephan, the focus of this article is on campaigns 
– defined as ‘a series of observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a political 
objective’ – rather than particular groups or organizations.12 Despite the great 
variation in objectives put forward amongst protesters in the four cases 
considered here, each of them may be classified as anti-regime campaigns. In 
Bahrain, the campaign is considered to have been ‘anti-monarchist’ following an 
initially reformist phase; in Egypt the pre-eminent demand from January 2011 
was ‘the fall of the regime’; while in Libya and Syria the Gadhafi and Assad regimes 
were targeted respectively.13 
Just as the distinction between violent and nonviolent campaigns is rarely 
clear-cut, the boundary between success and failure is also far from immediately 
self-evident. For Chenoweth and Stephan, success for a nonviolent campaign is 
defined as achievement of objectives within two years, having had ‘a discernable 
effect on the outcome’, whereas failure constitutes non-achievement of objectives 
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 Stephen Zunes, ‘Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Governments in the Third World: A 
New Kind of Revolution’, Third World Quarterly 15, no. 3 (1994): 403-404; Chenoweth and Stephan, 
Why Civil Resistance Works, 12. 
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or failure at least to ‘obtain significant concessions’ from the opponent (which for 
them constitutes ‘partial success’).14 This article adopts a broader interpretation 
of failure, by which transformation from a predominantly nonviolent to a 
predominantly violent campaign is also interpreted as failure, even if the 
campaign’s political objectives are achieved. Achievement only of superficial 
concessions is also interpreted as failure in this article. 
 Defining success and failure in respect of achievement of campaign 
objectives is highly problematic. Those using nonviolent methods may have a wide 
variety of goals, sometimes contradictory. The diverse array of actors involved in 
the protests since 2011 in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria cannot be understood 
to have been pursuing identical objectives, whether we consider events within 
each country individually or in all of these states considered together. 
Nevertheless, the broad objective of regime change is one that became central to 
all four cases examined here. Another issue, as Garton Ash has argued, is that ‘the 
timescale for success of nonviolent action can be very long’.15 Nevertheless, the 
evidence of some of the Arab uprisings since 2011 would appear to provide 
effective examples of different forms of failure (at least in the short term) through 
which the factors responsible for failure can be examined. The forms of failure 
explored in this article range from governmental suppression of nonviolent 
resistance, which has been notable in Bahrain, to substitution of predominantly 
nonviolent action by the use of predominantly of violence in Libya and Syria, to 
failure to achieve the objective of regime change despite superficial concessions 
                                                        
14
 Stephan and Chenoweth, ‘Why Civil Resistance Works’, 17. 
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 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘A Century of Civil Resistance: Some Lessons and Questions’, in Adam Roberts 
and Timothy Garton Ash (eds), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent 
Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 389. 
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in the Egyptian case. Whereas in the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and 
Outcomes Dataset success is understood to require ‘full achievement of … stated 
goals … within a year of the peak of activities’,16 in the four cases studied here 
more than three years have now passed since the peaks of the campaigns in 2011.  
 The four cases have been selected because they are illustrative of 
contrasting forms of failure: suppression, transformation into armed conflict, and 
non-achievement of objectives despite superficial concessions. They are also 
widely considered in literature on nonviolent action to constitute exemplars of 
nonviolent action, despite some deviation from nonviolent discipline.17 With 
respect to periodization, this article concentrates in each case on the timespan 
from the onset of campaign mobilization through to the consolidation of the 
outcome constituting failure, which varied considerably between cases. In the 
Bahraini case, the key period referred to in this article is from the 14 February 
2011 ‘Day of Rage’ through to the effective suppression of the protests on 15-18 
March 2011, culminating in the demolition of ‘Pearl roundabout’. In the case of 
Libya the focus is on the period from the 17 February 2011 ‘Day of Rage’ through 
to the external military intervention on 19 March 2011; and in Syria the key period 
considered is from the 15 March 2011 ‘Day of Rage’ through to the establishment 
of the Free Syrian Army on 29 July 2011 from which point the conflict is widely 
considered to have become a civil war. In the Egyptian case, the focus is on the 
period from the 25 January 2011 ‘Day of Rage’ through to the 3 July 2013 coup 
which made evident that the deposition of Mubarak represented a tactical 
                                                        
16
 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 14. 
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 See, for instance, Nepstad, ‘Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring’; Roberts and Garton Ash, 
‘Foreword’; and Stephen Zunes, ‘Nonviolent Revolution in the Middle East’, Peace Review: A Journal 
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concession rather than a change of regime away from military rule.18 Since the 
outcome in the Egyptian case was unclear before this point, a longer period is 
considered in this case than in the other cases. 
This article concentrates on failure in each of the four cases examined 
rather than success, since its purpose is to illustrate the dynamics which may 
contribute towards failure, which have been greatly less thoroughly explored than 
those which facilitate success. Comparisons with the already rich existing work on 
successful cases are made throughout the text. Effective strategic analysis 
requires consideration of the factors which may contribute towards failure as 
much as the factors which may contribute towards success, and it is the objective 
of this article to help redress the balance, which to date has been skewed towards 
consideration of successful cases.  
 Existing explanations of failures of nonviolent action have tended to 
concentrate on the absence of factors which are said to facilitate success. In one of 
the most rigorous treatments of the issue to date, for example, Chenoweth and 
Stephan claim that failure of nonviolent action in Burma can be attributed to the 
campaign’s failure to ‘create or maintain strong, cohesive, and decentralized 
networks with diverse membership’, inability to ‘separate the regime from its 
sources of power’, and absence of adequate international pressure on the 
opponent.19 Martin, Varney and Vickers, in their earlier study of failed campaigns 
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 With the coup, Egypt returned to ‘Not Free’ in the Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’ index, 
marking a return to its status under the Mubarak regime: Freedom House, ‘Egypt, Freedom in the World 
2014’, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/egypt-0#.U1ZWbRyQARB (accessed 
April 22, 2014). 
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 Stephan and Chenoweth, Why Civil Resistance Works, 184-191. 
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against repression in Indonesia, emphasise the absence of a ‘potentially 
sympathetic audience with access to information’.20 
 The variety of factors that have been put forward as contributory towards 
the success of a nonviolent action campaign, and the absence of which by 
implication may be considered to contribute towards failure, extends 
considerably beyond those put forward by Chenoweth and Stephan. The first part 
of this article will therefore explore the role that the absence of a broad range of 
external factors played in the failures of nonviolent action in the four uprisings 
examined here. The subsequent parts of this article will go one step further by 
revealing how adherence to principles of strategic nonviolent action may be 
insufficient in contributing towards success, and how, in contrast to the 
assumptions of the ‘political ju-jitsu’ model, nonviolent strategy itself may 
contribute towards failure. 
 
1. Explaining the failure of nonviolent action: the conventional approach 
Given the wide array of factors that the existing literature on nonviolent action 
has put forward as potentially explanatory of success, a logical first step towards 
understanding instances of failure of nonviolent action is to explore the role of the 
absence of these factors. This section of the article explores the role of the absence 
of factors external to nonviolent action campaigns in the failure of nonviolent 
action. 
 Factors external to a nonviolent resistance campaign include international 
and national aspects. Significant recent work has laid considerable emphasis on 
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 Martin, Varney and Vickers, ‘Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression’, 155. 
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the international dimension: in respect of the studies of the Oxford University 
project on Civil Resistance and Power Politics, for instance, it has been claimed 
that ‘almost every author emphasises the importance of the international 
context’.21 The international factors that may influence the outcomes of 
nonviolent action are very diverse. They include the involvement of foreign 
governments, intergovernmental organizations, and nonstate actors including 
transnational media. They extend also to broader aspects of the international 
context, such as the international balance of power, the state of the world 
economy, and the stability of international relations. 
 It has been claimed that the support of foreign governments for nonviolent 
action campaigns has been a contributory factor towards successful nonviolent 
action. Suggested examples have included financial assistance to Polish Solidarity 
by Western governments in the 1980s, and the role of the United States in the 
‘People Power’ revolution in the Philippines in 1986.22 One would therefore 
expect absence of effective support from foreign governments to be a possible 
contributory factor in instances of failure.  
 The experience of nonviolent resistance in Bahrain in 2011 is illustrative 
of at least three significant ways by which absence of effective pressure from 
foreign governments in support of a nonviolent resistance movement can operate. 
The first dynamic is active opposition on the part of foreign governments to the 
nonviolent resistance movement, in this case the neighbouring monarchical states 
such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates contributed troops at the 
                                                        
21
 Garton Ash, ‘A Century of Civil Resistance’, 384. 
22
 Garton Ash, ‘A Century of Civil Resistance’, 386; Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 155; Amado 
Mendoza, ‘“People Power” in the Philippines, 1983-86’ in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds), 
Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent Action from Gandhi to the Present 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 190. 
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invitation of Bahrain’s royal family, and according to the International Crisis 
Group ‘provided cover for the king to impose a state of emergency on 15 March 
and unleash a wave of repression, which put a stop to the protests.’23 The second 
aspect is equivocation on the part of foreign governments, illustrated in this case 
by the actions of the United States government, which with its Fifth Fleet stationed 
in Bahrain, close relationship with the royal families of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, 
and concern that Bahrain’s armed forces would not abandon their leadership, 
‘produced an equivocal position … acknowledging the legitimacy both of 
[Bahrain’s] concern for law and order and of its fears of potential Iranian 
meddling’.24 This leads on to the third dynamic, which is the way in which external 
support for nonviolent resisters from certain foreign governments can be 
counterproductive: despite a lack of evidence for direct Iranian involvement, the 
mere potential for this was important in the efforts of Bahrain’s government to 
challenge the legitimacy of the protesters. 
 The examples of Libya and Syria, for their part, reveal at least two ways by 
which foreign governments may contribute towards the transformation of a 
nonviolent movement into a violent campaign. The first of these is indirect, 
through the provision of resources to those advocating the use of violence. In 
respect of foreign governments providing resources to armed groups in Syria, a 
division developed between those including Great Britain and the United States 
which chose to supply predominantly non-lethal support such as communications 
technology and intelligence, and those including Qatar and Saudi Arabia which 
provided armaments. The second aspect, direct intervention, is illustrated by 
                                                        
23
 International Crisis Group, ‘Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain’s 
Rocky Road to Reform’, Middle East/North Africa Report 111 (July 28, 2011): 1. 
24
 Ibid., 21. 
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Operations Harmattan, Ellamy and Odyssey Dawn by France, Great Britain, and 
the United States respectively in Libya in March 2011. 
 Beyond the role of foreign governments, the influence of 
intergovernmental bodies has also been credited as significant in some apparently 
successful instances of nonviolent action. European Union funding for civil society 
in Georgia, for instance, is said to have been significant in the ‘Rose Revolution’ of 
2003.25 Absence of effective support from intergovernmental organizations for 
nonviolent resistance movements may therefore be a factor in unsuccessful cases. 
 Each of the five dynamics referred to in the discussion of foreign 
governmental influence in the failure of nonviolent action also involved 
intergovernmental bodies. Intergovernmental organizations have been significant 
in the legitimation and co-ordination of foreign government involvement which 
has facilitated either suppression of nonviolent resistance or contributed towards 
the transformation of nonviolent resistance into armed conflict. When the royal 
family of Bahrain invited Emirati and Saudi troops into its territory in March 2011 
it used the Gulf Cooperation Council to do so. It has further been claimed that UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 preceding the NATO bombardment 
of Libya in 2011 have suggested ‘the emergence of a doctrine that killings of 
peaceful demonstrators are unlawful, and … may provide a legitimate pretext for 
an international military response’.26  
 External actors that have been said to have been influential in successful 
instances of nonviolent action extend beyond governmental and 
                                                        
25
 Stephen Jones, ‘Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” of 2003: Enforcing Peaceful Change’, in Adam Roberts 
and Timothy Garton Ash (eds), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent 
Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 329. 
26
 Roberts and Garton Ash, ‘Foreword’, viii. 
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intergovernmental actors and include nonstate actors such as media 
organizations. Transnational media have been cited as significant in the diffusion 
of ideas, information and resistance strategies in numerous cases, including the 
‘velvet revolutions’ of 1989 and ‘colour revolutions’ of the early twenty-first 
century.27 As with foreign governments and intergovernmental bodies, one would 
expect the indifference or opposition of external nonstate actors including media 
organizations to nonviolent resistance movements to be potentially significant in 
unsuccessful cases.28 
 It has widely been claimed that transnational media, especially new social 
media such as Facebook and Twitter, have been important in the diffusion of 
information and communications among nonviolent resistance groups in the Arab 
uprisings since 2010.29 In the case of nonviolent resistance in Bahrain, however, 
television media which had devoted extensive coverage to protests elsewhere, 
such as Al Jazeera Arabic, dedicated comparatively little attention to protests in 
Bahrain, leaving campaigners to rely to a greater extent on Shiite news sources – 
a dependence which the government used in discrediting the movement in its 
claims of Iranian influence on the protests.30 
 The external context of nonviolent action extends beyond particular actors 
to dynamics such as the balance of power and international economic relations. 
With respect to the balance of power, Michael McFaul has argued that the 
transition from Cold War bipolarity to post-Cold War uni- or multi- polarity is the 
                                                        
27
 Mark Kramer, ‘The Dialectics of Empire: Soviet Leaders and the Challenge of Civil Resistance in 
East-Central Europe, 1968-91’, in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds), Civil Resistance and 
Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 107-108; Jones, ‘Georgia’s “Rose Revolution”’, 330-331. 
28
 Martin, Varney and Vickers, ‘Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression’, 155. 
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 See, for instance, Halim Rane and Sumra Salem, ‘Social media, social movements and the diffusion 
of ideas in the Arab uprisings’, Journal of International Communication 18, no. 1 (2012): 97-111. 
30
 International Crisis Group, ‘Bahrain’s Rocky Road’, 6. 
 13 
single most important explanation for the greater role for nonviolent resistance 
activity in post-Cold War democratic transitions compared with the Cold War 
era.31 At the regional level, however, the balance of power may present 
characteristics inhibitive of nonviolent action. Again, the example of Bahrain is 
instructive, situated in the context of what has been described as a ‘Gulf Cold War’ 
between Iran on the one hand and the monarchies alongside Bahrain in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council on the other.32 
 The role of ‘the forces of international economics and finance’ has been 
cited as significant in apparently successful instances of nonviolent action, such as 
the influence of indebtedness in the susceptibility of regimes in central and 
eastern Europe to nonviolent action in the 1980s.33 It has commonly been noted 
that Burma’s comparative lack of economic dependence on other countries has 
been a factor in its government’s ability to suppress nonviolent action.34 In 
Bahrain, the international economic context appears to have operated somewhat 
differently: with its revenues heavily dependent on oil exports, its economy 
cannot be described as self-sufficient, but given the dependence of other states on 
it for oil, this limits the potential for effective sanctions in support of nonviolent 
resistance movements there. 
Exploration of the role of external international factors in nonviolent action 
has been more common in recent than in earlier work, which laid greater 
emphasis on external factors within the countries in which nonviolent campaigns 
                                                        
31
 Michael McFaul, ‘External Dimensions of Democratic Breakthroughs’, paper presented at the 
Conference on Civil Resistance and Power Politics, University of Oxford, 14-18 March 2007. 
32
 Richard Rousseau, ‘The Gulf Cold War - Analysis’, Eurasia Review, February 15, 2012, 
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15022012-the-gulf-cold-war-analysis/ (accessed February 4, 2013). 
33
 Garton Ash, ‘A Century of Civil Resistance’, 385. 
34
 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 155. 
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take place. Aspects of the national context that have been claimed as significant in 
successful nonviolent action include ‘physical geography, through economic, 
political and military structures.’35 Physical geography may have contributed 
towards the failure of nonviolent action in Libya and Syria. In both cases a 
significant component of the transformation from nonviolent resistance into 
armed conflict took place after nonviolent resistance concentrated in peripheral 
locations such as Benghazi in the case of Libya, and Daraa in Syria, which became 
targets for military action by the regimes in each case.36 The military operations 
against the resisters in Benghazi and Daraa provided in turn the context for 
defections from the respective armed forces which were to become a significant 
component of the armed resistance to the regimes that was to supplant the 
previously preponderantly nonviolent movements.37 
A frequent theme in literature on successful instances of nonviolent action 
is the role of regime openness, and of reforms being made by previously more 
closed regimes. Amongst the most commonly cited examples is the role of 
Gorbachev’s reforms in transforming the responses to nonviolent resistance by 
the Soviet Union in the 1980s.38 Similarly, literature on successful social 
movements emphasises the significance of open political opportunity 
structures.39 One would expect the absence of reforms to contribute towards the 
failure of nonviolent action. In each of the cases under examination here of 
nonviolent action transforming into violent conflict, and of governmental 
                                                        
35
 Garton Ash, ‘A Century of Civil Resistance’, 388. 
36
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suppression of nonviolent action, political reforms in the period preceding the 
protests in Bahrain, Libya and Syria in 2011 had been insubstantial; political 
reforms in Egypt from 2004 were more extensive, but had fallen into reverse from 
2006.40   
A significant dimension to the political opportunity structure in each of 
these three cases relates to the capacity and will of the regimes to exploit societal 
divisions in their populations. In Egypt, for instance, the military has effectively 
implemented a ‘divide and rule’ strategy to perpetuate its dominance following 
the deposition of Mubarak, exploiting the reluctance of Islamist and other parties 
representing different sectors of the population to cooperate with one another.41 
In Syria, beyond the commonly cited role of Alawite support for the regime and 
Alawite preponderance in its armed forces, the opposition has suffered notable 
divisions between Kurdish and Islamist groups.42 Gadhafi, too, has been accused 
of ‘divide and rule tactics’, and his family attributed the transformation to violent 
resistance in the country to its ‘tribal character’.43 Given the contrast between 
Bahrain’s Sunni ruling family and its predominantly Shiite population, the 
sectarian dimension of Bahrain’s uprising has also been frequently noted.44 In 
each case, the regimes’ exploitation of divisions in their populations has played a 
                                                        
40
 Ellen Lust-Okar, ‘Reform in Syria: Steering between the Chinese Model and Regime Change’, in 
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critical role in limiting the leverage of the nonviolent resistance movements in 
relation to the regimes and their supporters. 
 Of the factors external to nonviolent action significant to its success 
amongst the most widely cited is the role of divisions in the regime, and especially 
the separability of the armed forces from the government. According to 
Chenoweth and Stephan a key distinguishing feature of nonviolent from violent 
campaigns is their greater capacity to divide regimes from their ‘pillars of 
support’, particularly through encouraging ‘loyalty shifts among security forces’.45 
This builds on the earlier work of authors such as Sharp, Helvey, and Ackerman 
and Kruegler, which has emphasised the centrality to nonviolent strategy of 
targeting a regime’s capacity to deploy armed forces.46  
 It has been argued in support of this claim that in respect of the uprising in 
Tunisia, ‘when Army Chief Rachid Ammar refused orders to shoot civilians, Ben 
Ali realized that he had no means of enforcing his rule and thus he fled to Saudia 
Arabia on January 14’.47 The dynamics in Egypt leading up to the deposition of 
Mubarak are thought to have been similar, and have been viewed as a further case 
in which ‘the military as an institution shifted allegiance from the state to the 
opposition’.48 A strategy of the protesters in Cairo was to chant ‘the army and the 
people are one’, and this is thought to have contributed towards ‘a measure of 
cooperation from the armed forces’.49 However, the extent of this cooperation was 
to be highly limited. Stein, for instance, has argued that Egypt’s Supreme Council 
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of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was ‘able to exploit the opportunity offered by the 
mass action of January 2011 to settle some old scores’ with rival factions in the 
regime, before shifting its priority to returning Egyptian political life ‘to normal’, 
retaining its preponderance.50 
 In Bahrain, in contrast, the suppression of nonviolent action appears to 
have been facilitated in part by the failure of the nonviolent resistance movement 
to achieve significant loyalty shifts in the armed forces, with the regime exploiting 
factors already mentioned such as societal divisions and external military 
assistance. As Nepstad has noted, Bahrain’s monarchy had recruited to its armed 
forces Sunnis from other countries, who had ‘a political stake in’ and ‘individual 
level incentives to remain loyal to the regime’, given their ‘sectarian political 
privileges and naturalized citizenship’.51 
The transformation from nonviolent to violent resistance in Libya and 
Syria displays a very different dynamic with respect to the relationship between 
nonviolent resistance and the role of the armed forces to that traditionally put 
forward in the literature on nonviolent strategy. Rather than convincing the 
governing structures of the armed forces to shift loyalty, the nonviolent protest 
movements instead were joined by defectors from the armed forces, which were 
to help transform the resistance from predominantly nonviolent protest into civil 
war. Again, societal divisions played a role: in Syria, for instance, much of the rank-
and-file of the armed forces consisted of Sunni conscripts, and many of the 
defections have been attributed to their closer identification with Sunni civil 
resisters than the predominantly Alawite state.52 
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 The international and national factors which contributed towards the 
failure of nonviolent action range from general characteristics of the balance of 
power and global political economy, to the policies of external governmental, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental actors, to particular geographical, 
demographic and institutional characteristics of each national context. As the 
third section of this article will highlight, different combinations of these factors 
helped to provide facilitative contexts for the different pathways for the failure of 
nonviolent action in each case. 
 
2. The failure of nonviolent strategy 
So far the discussion in this article has concentrated on external factors which may 
have contributed towards the failure of nonviolent action, at both international 
and national levels. The literature on nonviolent strategy, on the other hand, has 
generally tended to focus more on the characteristics of the nonviolent resistance 
movement itself and its strategies. As with the external factors, existing literature 
has focused for the most part on specifying the factors that are thought to 
contribute towards success. Whereas the preceding section explored the role of 
absence of the external factors thought to contribute towards success in the 
failures of nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria, the following 
paragraphs will reveal how possession of many of the attributes associated with 
successful nonviolent strategy may have been insufficient in producing a 
successful outcome in these cases. It will build towards the discussion in the third 
section of the pathways by which nonviolent action may contribute towards its 
own failure. 
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 Among the key characteristics of successful nonviolent resistance 
campaigns is assumed to be ‘organizational strength’ including leadership that 
‘represents the breadth of the nation’, widespread and diverse participation, and 
‘access to critical material resources’ including ‘swift and accurate 
communications’.53 There were some limitations to the organizational strength of 
the nonviolent resistance movements under consideration here: for instance, it 
has been argued that a common theme to the Arab uprisings of 2011 was their 
apparently ‘leaderless’ quality, without single identifiable individuals 
spearheading nonviolent action.54 However, the most recent work on successful 
nonviolent strategy has tended to emphasise the way in which ‘overreliance on a 
single personality for leadership in a movement is likely to constrain the campaign 
in key ways’.55 In Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria, the nonviolent movements may 
have lacked single personalities, but in some cases leadership in the promotion of 
nonviolent methods was provided such as by youth groups including Egypt’s 6 
April Youth Movement and the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights.56  
Beyond leadership, other aspects of organizational strength appear to have 
been present. Rapid communications facilitated by new information technology 
including social media, for instance, are amongst the most widely popularised 
characteristics of the 2011 uprisings.57 Despite being limited by the national 
contextual factors explored in the preceding section of this article, the nonviolent 
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movements in Bahrain and Egypt could claim considerable participation. 
Although the nonviolent protests in Bahrain have been dominated by the 
country’s Shia population, participation in marches in January 2011 is estimated 
to have included 40% of the population.58 It has been claimed that mobilization in 
the nonviolent protests in Egypt in January 2011 was particularly broad, 
encompassing ‘men and women, Christian and Muslim, young and old, workers 
and intellectuals, poor and middle-class, secular and religious’ participants.59 
Where nonviolent action was to be followed by civil war in Libya and Syria, 
participation in the nonviolent movement had been on a less considerable scale. 
Works on nonviolent strategy have emphasised the role of ‘functional 
objectives’ including ‘clear and limited goals’ in successful instances of nonviolent 
action.60 The clear and limited objective of removal of a leader from office was 
central to all of the instances of nonviolent resistance under consideration here.61 
However, this was to be far from a sufficient condition for ‘successful’ nonviolent 
action. Unity around this objective in the Egyptian uprising helped ensure that a 
diverse array of religious and secular, middle and working class participants took 
part in the protests of January 2011. However, the absence of unity around 
subsequent aims has, as was discussed in the preceding section, been exploited by 
the military command in Egypt in limiting the subsequent political reforms. In 
Bahrain, the existence of considerable opposition to the objective, reflected in 
substantial pro-government protests such as the 21 February 2011 ‘Gathering of 
National Unity’ and the failure of the armed forces to shift loyalty, was to 
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contribute towards failure. In Libya and Syria, the objective was to unite armed as 
well as unarmed resistance. 
Given the insufficiency of clear and limited objectives to successful 
nonviolent action, strategists of nonviolent conflict have also laid emphasis on 
tactical factors such as ‘systematic planning’ aimed at separating a regime from its 
‘pillars of support’.62 Relative absence of systematic planning among nonviolent 
protesters may have been significant in the transformation of the ‘comparatively 
unorganised’ resistance in Libya and Syria from nonviolent into armed conflict.63 
On the other hand, the systematic efforts of groups such as 6 April Youth 
Movement and the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights towards inducing 
loyalty shifts in the armed forces in Egypt and Bahrain respectively were to have 
only limited short-term effects such as contributing towards deposition of 
Mubarak in the case of Egypt, and were unsuccessful in bringing about separation 
of the regime from its ‘pillars of support’ in Bahrain. 
Further tactical factors emphasised in the literature on nonviolent strategy 
include use of ‘multiple channels of resistance’ and ‘multiple methods of 
nonviolent action’, ‘wide dispersion’ of nonviolent methods, ability to ‘shift 
between methods of concentration and methods of dispersion’, ‘tactical diversity’ 
and ‘strategic creativity and innovation’.64 All four of the cases discussed in this 
article involved the use of multiple channels and methods, concentration and 
dispersion, and innovation. The uprisings in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria have 
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all been celebrated for their strategic innovation, particularly with respect to use 
of social media such as YouTube to mobilise widespread support through 
documenting and publicising government abuses, and Facebook and Twitter to 
facilitate implementation of nonviolent protest methods at short notice.65 The 
variety of nonviolent methods used was considerable, including the ‘methods of 
protest and persuasion’ such as the ‘days of rage’, demonstrations and marches 
seen in all four cases explored in this article, as well as ‘methods of non-
cooperation’ such as the strike actions in Bahrain, Egypt and Syria, and ‘methods 
of nonviolent intervention’ such as the occupations of public spaces including 
Tahrir Square and Pearl Roundabout.66 Concentrated actions such as these were 
accompanied by widely dispersed nonviolent action, with protests in locations 
encompassing population centres from Al Dair to Dar Kulaib, Alexandria to Aswan, 
Zawiya to Tobruk, and Daraa to Qamishli. Tactical innovation, diversity, 
concentration and dispersal were all insufficient in contributing towards 
successful nonviolent action. 
 
3. ‘Political ju-jitsu’ in reverse: four pathways 
At the centre of discussions of nonviolent strategy, a recurring claim has been that 
‘essential to strategic success’ is ‘nonviolent discipline’, which ‘is the ingredient 
that turns confrontations between adversaries into victories that serve the ends 
of strategies’.67 The rationale for this argument is provided in Gene Sharp’s 
concept of ‘political ju-jitsu’ by which a regime’s violent response to nonviolent 
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action ‘is not met by counter-violence, but instead with nonviolent defiance’ that 
‘can cause their violent repression to rebound against their own position’.68 This 
rebound is said to operate on account of ‘widespread revulsion against the 
opponents [in the regime] for their brutality’ which may lead to more people 
taking part in the resistance, greater support for the resistance from third parties, 
and conversion of the armed forces away from the regime.69 
 Sharp acknowledges that ‘various important factors’ may determine 
whether or not the process of political ju-jitsu operates successfully, such as the 
nature and actions of the regime and third parties.70 Martin, Varney and Vickers 
have emphasised that for political ju-jitsu to be successful ‘third-party audiences 
need to know about what is happening and be potentially concerned’.71 The ways 
in which political ju-jitsu may fail merit further investigation. The cases explored 
here illustrate four different models for the failure of political ju-jitsu. 
Furthermore, the following paragraphs reveal ways in which nonviolent strategy 
may have not only failed to succeed, but also been counterproductive. 
 It might be argued that the cases under consideration here fail fully to meet 
the criterion of movements that adhered to the principle of nonviolent discipline. 
Elements of the resistance in Egypt, for instance, are reported on 2 February 2011 
to have used methods such as stone-throwing and arrests of violent pro-regime 
counter-demonstrators which had attacked them.72 Resistance in Libya in mid-
February 2011, before the transformation into civil war, also featured violent 
methods. However, instances of violence have been present in many of the most 
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paradigmatic examples of nonviolent resistance campaigns,73 and they have not 
precluded the Bahraini, Egyptian, Libyan or Syrian cases from being considered 
among them, with the Libyan and Syrian cases being limited to the period 
preceding defections from the armed forces and transformation into civil war.74 
In the Libyan case, this period is somewhat short, but the first week is considered 
to have been ‘overwhelmingly nonviolent’.75 
 Each of the four cases explored in this article represents a different 
pathway for the failure of political ju-jitsu to operate. Furthermore, each case may 
represent a pathway by which nonviolent strategy itself may contribute towards 
failure. As the ensuing discussion will highlight, nonviolent strategy interacted 
with key external international and national factors to bring about each pathway.  
The first pathway may be illustrated by the case of Bahrain. In this model, 
nonviolent strategy fails to succeed in conversion of the armed forces or sufficient 
external actors in support of the purposes of the movement, and the movement is 
subdued by the national armed forces. Contextual aspects explored in the first 
section of this article such as geopolitical rivalries and the regime’s exploitation of 
societal divisions contributed towards the operation of this model in Bahrain. The 
case would appear to provide evidence for the operation of the dynamics 
highlighted by Martin, Varney and Vickers: ‘the presence of a potentially 
sympathetic audience with access to information’76 was limited in this case at both 
national and international levels. As the first section of this article has highlighted 
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while the strategic role of Bahrain in relation to Iran played a role in limiting the 
sympathy of international actors to the nonviolent protest movement, the 
regime’s provision of sectarian privileges to Sunnis its armed forces limited the 
operation of sympathy at the national level.  
Explanations looking only to the role of external factors, however, are 
insufficient to understanding the failure of nonviolent action in Bahrain. A further 
dynamic worth noting relates to the role of nonviolent strategy itself in this 
process. Where a regime has the capacity and the will to repress and there are 
limitations to the sympathy of third parties, a nonviolent campaign is liable to 
provide a highly vulnerable target for violent suppression. In Bahrain the capacity 
and will to repress was assisted by the active opposition of some external third 
parties, and the violent suppression of the nonviolent protests from 15 March 
2011 following arrival of Gulf Cooperation Council forces took just three days to 
implement.  
 The sequence of events in Egypt may be illustrative of a second pathway 
for the failure of political ju-jitsu. In this model, nonviolent action contributes 
towards cosmetic reforms, but fails to result in changes which satisfy many of the 
protesters’ objectives. In this case, despite the removal of Mubarak from office, 
military dictatorship persisted. As discussed in the first section, external factors 
such as the military command’s capacity and will to exploit divisions between 
Islamist and secular factions contributed towards the operation of this model in 
Egypt. In contrast with the Bahrain case, the splits exploited by the military 
command in Egypt were between different sectors among the opposition, rather 
than between members of the armed forces and the protesters. In common with 
the Bahrain case, the sympathy of international audiences was limited by 
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geopolitical factors, with the United States resuming military assistance to Egypt 
in 2012, when Hillary Clinton waived a Congressional requirement to certify 
protection of human rights in the country on account of ‘Egypt’s enduring role as 
a security partner and leader in promoting regional stability and peace’.77 
As with the first model, the second model of nonviolent action failure 
illustrated by the Egyptian case cannot be attributed to the role of external factors 
alone. Nonviolent strategy also contributes towards operation of this model, 
whereby control over legitimate use of violence remains concentrated in the 
military command, which in the absence of powerful alternatives may be able to 
shape reforms in response to nonviolent action as it sees fit, and potentially to the 
furtherance of its own preponderant position. A key component of nonviolent 
strategy deployed in the Egyptian case was for protesters to emphasise common 
cause between the armed forces and nonviolent protesters embodied in slogans 
such as ‘the army and the people are one’, which while facilitative of divisions 
between the military command and Mubarak in the short term, in the long term 
helped legitimate the pre-eminence of the military in Egypt’s governance 
following Mubarak’s demise. 
 A third pathway for the failure of political ju-jitsu may be evident in the 
sequence of events in Syria. In this model, adherence to methods of strategic 
nonviolent action by the resistance movement may succeed in converting 
segments of the armed forces to the opposition, rather than converting the armed 
forces as a whole, resulting in a split in the armed forces which contributes 
towards escalation into a civil war. In the Syrian case, the role of contextual factors 
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explored earlier in this article such as societal divisions appears to have been 
significant in the conversion of only segments of the armed forces by the 
nonviolent resistance movement. Whereas in Bahrain the key societal division 
was between the armed forces and the protesters, and in Egypt it was between 
differing components of the opposition, in Syria the key splits were within the 
armed forces, with Sunni conscripts forming the majority of defectors from the 
Alawite-dominated military command in summer 2011.78 The development of 
competing armed factions in Syria was exacerbated by foreign military assistance 
from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to armed defectors, while the Syrian regime was 
provided with military assistance from Russia (whose sole naval base beyond the 
former USSR is in Syria).79 
As with the first two models, external factors alone do not fully explain the 
operation of the third model illustrated by the Syrian case. The role of nonviolent 
strategy itself is also important to consider. Following the logic of political ju-jitsu 
and the claims in the literature on nonviolent strategy, ‘nonviolent campaigns are 
more likely to produce loyalty shifts’ in the armed forces than violent campaigns.80 
By implication, nonviolent action may be more likely to contribute towards loyalty 
shifts among only a segment of armed forces that may play a part in the 
transformation of a conflict into civil war. As Nepstad notes, ‘in contrast to 
nonviolent researchers’ claims, not all defections are productive for civil 
resistance struggles’.81 In the Syrian case, a sympathetic audience to nonviolent 
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protesters was to be found not among the armed forces as a whole but among only 
sectors of the armed forces, whose defections were to play an important part in 
the transformation into civil war. 
 The fourth model of the failure of political ju-jitsu may be illustrated by the 
sequence of events in Libya. Here, too, there were splits within the armed forces, 
and the logic of the third model appears to have developed in a similar fashion to 
the Syrian case. However, the Libyan case also illustrates a further set of dynamics, 
in respect of which the role of external actors is of greater significance than in the 
third model. Geopolitical considerations in Libya were the inverse of those in the 
cases of Bahrain and Egypt: despite détente in the 2000s, relations between NATO 
member states and Gadhafi’s regime were historically tense (Gadhafi’s reputation 
as the ‘mad dog of the Middle East’82 proved hard to shake off), and in comparison 
with Syria, the Russian strategic interest in Libya was limited.  
As with the other three pathways, external circumstances such as these are 
only part of the explanation for the sequence of events in Libya. It is also important 
to look at the role of nonviolent strategy. In the fourth model, like in the third, the 
logic of political ju-jitsu operates as intended, with the nonviolent discipline of the 
movement assisting in the conversion of third parties to its cause. Also like in the 
third model, in the fourth model the means used by the third parties in support of 
the movement’s goals escalate the role of violence in the conflict. However, 
whereas in the third model a sympathetic audience is to be found among internal 
violent actors, in the fourth model it is to be found in external progenitors of 
violence. In the period leading up to NATO-led intervention in Libya, the use of 
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armed force by the regime against apparently peaceful protesters was significant 
in the legitimation of subsequent military intervention by foreign governments. 
This is evident in the texts of the UN Security Council resolutions preceding 
Operation Unified Protector, with resolution 1970 condemning ‘the repression of 
peaceful demonstrators’ and resolution 1973 authorising ‘all necessary measures 
… to protect civilians’.83 The use of nonviolent methods on the part of the 
resistance movement may therefore facilitate the legitimation of the use of armed 
force by others, and in turn contribute towards the perception that nonviolent 
action may be a tool exploited by external actors.  
The operation of the four pathways of failed nonviolent action illustrated 
in this article has been argued to have taken place in the context of differing 
national and international circumstances and to have involved different dynamics 
of nonviolent action in each case. While some of the factors inhibiting successful 
nonviolent action (such as limited regime openness and reforms) were common 
to the four cases, there were a number of key distinguishing features among the 
cases which help to explain the operation of the four distinctive pathways. These 
contrasting characteristics are summarised in Table 1. They include the role of 
external geopolitical interests, societal divisions among the armed forces and 
protesters, and the role of nonviolent strategy.  
 
[Insert Table 1 approximately here (Table 1 is provided at the end of this 
document on page 32)]  
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Conclusion 
Through its evaluation of the experience of nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, 
Libya and Syria, this article has explored four potential avenues by which 
nonviolent action may fail: suppression, reforms that fail to meet resisters’ 
expectations, transformation into international armed conflict, and 
transformation into civil war. In exploring these cases, a much wider range of 
factors that may contribute towards the failure of strategic nonviolent action have 
been evaluated in this article than have traditionally been assessed. These include 
external factors at both international and national levels.  
Foreign governments may inhibit achievement of a nonviolent campaign’s 
objectives through active opposition, equivocation, or contributing towards 
perceptions that the campaign is serving foreign interests. They may also play a 
role in the transformation of nonviolent conflict into armed conflict through 
assistance to armed factions, and through direct intervention. Intergovernmental 
bodies may facilitate the legitimation of each of these roles of governmental 
actors. Absence of effective assistance from nonstate actors including foreign 
media may also be significant, as may wider aspects of the international context, 
such as the regional balance of power and economic interdependencies that may 
influence the decisions of external governments. 
At the national level, the factors relevant to failure may include both 
properties of the territory and population, and properties of the regime targeted 
by nonviolent action. A regime’s exploitation of societal divisions may play a 
critical role in inhibiting loyalty shifts in the armed forces from the regime to the 
nonviolent resistance movement, and may contribute towards splits in the armed 
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forces that can contribute towards the transformation from unarmed resistance 
to civil war.  
Beyond disaggregating international and national circumstances which 
may influence the failure of nonviolent action, this article has also explored how 
adherence to some of the most widely-acknowledged principles of nonviolent 
strategy may be insufficient in contributing towards a successful outcome. 
Possession of resources such as widespread participation and rapid means of 
communication, as well as limited objectives, systematic planning, and multiple 
methods and channels of resistance may be insufficient in contributing towards 
success in the context of inhibitive national and international circumstances. 
Furthermore, this article has explored four pathways by which strategic 
nonviolent action, rather than undermining the target of the nonviolent campaign 
as assumed in the ‘political ju-jitsu’ model, itself may be counterproductive. 
Nonviolent action may provide a highly vulnerable target for a regime with the 
will and the means to repress, it may help legitimate the concentration of power 
in the hands of a military command that may constrain regime responses, it may 
contribute towards splits in armed forces that in turn help facilitate 
transformation of a conflict into civil war, and it may be used by external actors to 
justify armed intervention. While this article has found support for Martin, Varney 
and Vickers’ claim that the presence of an informed and potentially sympathetic 
audience is significant to the operation of political ju-jitsu, this article has argued 
that where that sympathetic audience consists only of segments of national armed 
forces or of international actors prepared to use violence, the logic of political ju-
jitsu plays a part in the transformation from nonviolent into violent conflict.  
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If the dynamics facilitating the failure of nonviolent action are to be 
avoided, it is important for strategists of nonviolent action to address the national 
and international circumstances which facilitate their operation. In its synopsis of 
differing circumstances that operated in the four cases examined here, it is hoped 
that this article has provided an indicative set of factors with the potential to be 
tested in other contexts. 
 
Table 1: Key contrasting characteristics of the failure of strategic nonviolent action in Bahrain, 
Egypt, Libya and Syria 
Case Form of failure Key geopolitical 
interests 
Key societal 
divisions 
Role of nonviolent strategy in 
failure 
Bahrain Suppression Pro-regime (role in 
balancing Iran) 
Between 
armed forces 
and protesters 
Vulnerability of protesters to 
military repression  
Egypt Superficial 
concessions 
Pro-regime (SCAF a 
‘partner … promoting 
regional stability’) 
Within 
protesters 
Legitimation of armed forces’ 
pre-eminence (‘the army and 
the people are one’) 
Libya International 
armed conflict 
Anti-regime 
(Gadhafi’s ‘mad dog’ 
reputation) 
Within armed 
forces and 
protesters 
Provokes sympathy of 
external violent actors 
Syria Civil war Pro-regime (Russia) & 
anti-regime (Qatar & 
Saudi Arabia) 
Within armed 
forces and 
protesters 
Provokes sympathy of 
internal violent actors 
 
